WORKING K-25
INTO THE MIX
Oak Ridge: Clinton (1943-1944)
Events: The Uranium
Path to the Bomb, 1942-1944
In 1941 and 1942, gaseous diffusion
had been considered by many as the most promising method of enriching
uranium. The British in the
influential 1941 MAUD Report had advocated the
use of gaseous diffusion alone,
and the 1942 Lewis committee placed it first
among isotope separation methods.
Despite the soundness of the theory, the process had yet to produce any
samples of enriched uranium when the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant
was authorized in late 1942.
This disconnect between theory and practice carried over from the laboratory
to the factory. Even before construction began, it was decided in late
summer 1943 that K-25 would not attempt to create weapons-grade uranium by
itself. Instead it would produce material that was about fifty
percent uranium-235, which would then be fed into Y-12's Beta tracks (above) for final
enrichment. This would allow the elimination of the troublesome upper part
of the cascade, but even fifty percent enrichment was not assured since a
barrier for the diffusion plant still did not exist. The decision to
downgrade K-25 was part of the larger decision to double Y-12 capacity and fit
with Groves's new strategy of utilizing a combination of methods to produce
enough fissionable material for bombs as soon as possible.
There was no doubt in Groves's mind that gaseous diffusion still had to be
pursued vigorously. Not only had major resources already been expended on
the program, but there was also the possibility that it might yet prove
successful. Y-12 was in trouble as 1944 began, and the plutonium pile
projects were just getting underway. A workable barrier design might still
put K-25 ahead in the race for the bomb. Unfortunately, no one had been
able to fabricate a barrier of sufficient quality; the uranium gas was simply too
corrosive, the necessary tolerances too fine. By the summer of 1944, the
ongoing barrier crisis made it apparent that the material produced by K-25 would
be of such low enrichment that it would first have to be run through Y-12's
Alpha tracks before it would be ready for the Betas. To accomplish even
this low level of enrichment Groves had to order a crash barrier program.
The production of enough uranium-235 for even one bomb by 1945 now appeared to
be very much in doubt.

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